By: Dr. James Ralte, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science,
Easwari School of Liberal Arts, SRM University-AP. (Amaravati)
What stood out at the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi was not complete agreement among its members. There was little chance of that happening. The more striking fact was that countries with very different interests were prepared to sit at the same table and keep talking.
India and China remain competitors, despite working together within BRICS. Iran has a difficult relationship with the West, while the United Arab Emirates is closely connected to Western economies. Russia is locked in confrontation with Europe and the United States. Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia have their own priorities and do not wish to be drawn into another country’s geopolitical contest. BRICS is, therefore, an unusual gathering. But perhaps that is why it matters.
The grouping is sometimes described as an anti-Western alliance. This is too simple. Most BRICS members maintain important relations with the United States and Europe. India, for example, is a member of the Quad and has steadily deepened its partnership with Washington. At the same time, it continues to work with Russia and participates actively in BRICS. New Delhi does not see these relationships as mutually exclusive.
BRICS is better understood as an attempt to create more room for countries that have often found themselves on the margins of global decision-making. Its members may disagree on many questions, but they share a dissatisfaction with the way international institutions are run.
The structure of the United Nations Security Council still reflects the world of 1945. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have introduced reforms over the years, yet their distribution of influence continues to favour the older industrial powers. This appears increasingly difficult to justify when much of the world’s economic growth and population is now concentrated in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
The expansion of BRICS reflects this wider change. With Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the UAE joining Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the grouping now reaches across several regions. A larger membership gives it greater international weight. It also creates a practical problem: the more varied the group becomes, the harder it is to reach agreement.
The New Delhi Declaration must be viewed against this background. It called for changes in global governance, criticised unilateral trade restrictions and appealed for restraint in the Middle East. Its language was careful and, at times, predictable. Even so, securing a common declaration among members with such different political interests was not insignificant.
Declarations, of course, are the easy part of summit diplomacy. The real test begins after the leaders leave.
BRICS will remain relevant only if it can produce useful cooperation. The New Development Bank is one example of what the grouping can accomplish. It was established to support infrastructure and sustainable-development projects without simply reproducing the priorities of existing Western-led financial institutions. Discussions about payment systems and the use of national currencies also show that members want some protection from political pressure exercised through international finance.
There are other areas where cooperation could produce visible results. Sharing satellite data can improve weather forecasting, agricultural planning and responses to natural disasters. Joint work on public health, food security, climate adaptation and digital infrastructure may not attract the same attention as debates about a new world order, but it could matter far more to ordinary citizens.
For India, BRICS is useful because it suits the country’s long-standing preference for retaining independence in foreign policy. India does not want to choose permanently between the West and its challengers. It wants the ability to work with different partners on different issues. Hosting the summit allowed New Delhi to present this approach as a strength rather than a contradiction.
One should not exaggerate what BRICS can achieve. It cannot erase the rivalry between India and China or produce a shared position on every war and crisis. There is also a danger that annual declarations will become a substitute for action.
Yet the grouping speaks to a genuine change in world politics. Countries outside the West are no longer willing merely to accept rules framed by others. They want a say in writing those rules. The New Delhi summit did not transform the international order, but it made this demand harder to ignore.
